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C O M P E T I N G  P E R S P E C T I V E S
Introduction
SOCIAL WORKERS TODAY face an unprecedented op-
portunity to place social work on unshakable scientific
foundations that are also consistent with social work’s
long-standing humanistic values. Social workers can real-
ize this opportunity only by definitively turning away from
the unsound and detrimental set of beliefs derived from
logical positivism (or logical empiricism, see below) and
embracing the beliefs currently espoused in the philoso-
phy of science and the “hard” sciences, and imported into
social work by Martha Heineman Pieper (1981, 1989;
Tyson, 1995) as the heuristic paradigm. Already, many so-
cial workers have chosen the heuristic paradigm for devel-
oping and evaluating social work research and knowledge:
The heuristic paradigm is now taught in many masters and
doctoral social work programs; research based on the
heuristic paradigm has been published in several social
work publications (D’Haene, 1995; Murdach, 1995;
Heineman Pieper & Pieper, 1992; Tyson, 1999, 2000;
Tyson & Carroll, 2001); there is increasing acceptance of
methodological pluralism or “many ways of knowing”
(Davidson, 1988; Dean & Fenby, 1989; Goldstein, 2000;
Hartman, 1990; Laird, 1993; Saleebey, 1994; Weick,
1991; Witkin, 1995); and, in general, uncritical accep-
tance of the flawed logical empiricist paradigm has been
replaced with a lively debate over which foundations we
will choose for our field.
The heuristic paradigm is a metatheory of research that
starts from the realization (already well known in up-to-
date philosophy of science and the hard sciences) that
there are no privileged realities or ways of knowing, and
therefore that there is no way to include all relevant infor-
mation in data gathering and analysis. Thus, all ways of
knowing (including all research methods) lose and distort
some information in the process of gathering and analyz-
ing data (that is, all acts of knowing rely on strategies, or
heuristics). Following Wimsatt (1986) and Simon (1966),
we define heuristics broadly as ways of perceiving, know-
ing, and solving problems (Bolland & Atherton, this issue),
give the definition of a heuristic as if it were the definition
of the heuristic paradigm, but this conflates a concept with
a research paradigm). Each way of knowing (each heuris-
tic) tends to distort and lose information in systematic
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Social work today faces a crucial watershed: Will the field continue to promulgate unsound and detrimental beliefs about 
social work research and knowledge, or will the field fully embrace the heuristic paradigm and thereby realize its true 
potential as a first-rate science committed to humanistic ideals? Proponents of unsound and detrimental beliefs have 
obscured the choice for social workers by systematically and thoroughly misrepresenting the heuristic paradigm, making 
unwarranted and misleading claims for the paradigms to which it is opposed (logical empiricism and relativism), and confus-
ing the issues at stake for the field. Accordingly, this article helps social workers recognize the tenets and implications of each
of the three paradigms for research that social work has available to it—the heuristic paradigm, logical empiricism, and 
relativism—so that social workers can make a truly informed choice about the best approach to knowledge in their field.
ways (have systematic biases; Wimsatt, 1981, 1986). Un-
like prejudice, which refers to unjust and destructive atti-
tudes towards others, bias, as used here, refers to the in-
evitable limitations on any one person’s—or
group’s—perspective that accompany any act of knowing.
Because all ways of knowing have systematic biases, it is
better to recognize and manage these biases (as the heuris-
tic paradigm teaches researchers to do) than to overlook
or deny them (as the logical empiricist paradigm teaches
researchers to do). In fact, as we will see, when logical em-
piricists overlook or deny the biases of their preferred ways
of knowing and correspondingly overplay the biases in and
devalue or reject other ways of knowing, bias is amplified
well beyond the systematic but manageable levels of indi-
vidual heuristics and becomes systemic (system-wide).
Under logical empiricism, bias proliferates to the level of
creating severe, unrecognized, and harmful distortions
that pervade the entire knowledge base of the field. In
contrast, the heuristic paradigm offers social workers pow-
erful and effective conceptual tools—drawn from the phi-
losophy of science and the hard sciences—that enable re-
searchers to apply heuristics effectively and productively to
reduce and manage bias, and to yield reliable, robust, and
significant scientific knowledge (Callebaut, 1993; Heine-
man Pieper, 1981, 1989; Margenau, 1966; Sperry, 1983;
Tyson, 1995; Wimsatt, 1981, 1986, 1987).
When Heineman Pieper first introduced the heuristic
paradigm into social work 20 years ago, opponents cate-
gorically rejected the entire heuristic paradigm, including
all of its component ideas (Bloom, 1990; Epstein, 1993;
Geismar, 1982; Hudson, 1982; Schuerman, 1982). Later,
some tried to overpower the heuristic paradigm through a
show of superior force (misusing their numbers and status,
e.g., Grinnell, Austin, Blyth, Briar, et al., 1994). (For an
incisive analysis that illuminates why this may have hap-
pened, see Collins, 1990, p. 219, and Hartman, 1995.)
Proponents of logical empiricism continue to constrain
academic freedom (as documented by Cloward, 1998),
devalue research contributions that do not match their un-
warranted, methodologically-based criteria for scientific
knowledge (Grinnell, 1997; Rubin & Babbie, 2001; Task
Force on Social Work Research, 1991; Williams, Unrau, &
Grinnell, 1998), create divisions between practitioners and
researchers and between scientists and advocates (Gibbs,
1983; Reid, 1994a; Rubin & Babbie, 2001; Thyer &
Myers, 1998), promote or exclude approaches to practice
based solely on whether or not they are supported by a
flawed and pervasively distorting (logical empiricist) ap-
proach to research (Myers & Thyer, 1997; Reid, 1994a,
1994b; Thyer, 1991), and completely misrepresent the
heuristic paradigm and the issues at stake for the field
(Anastas & MacDonald, 1994; Anastas, 1999; Bolland &
Atherton, this issue; Thyer, 1993; Williams, Unrau, &
Grinnell, 1998). These problems are exacerbated by logi-
cal empiricist textbooks that first thoroughly misrepresent
the ideas and issues involved, and then do not even pro-
vide students with citations to the sources capable of rec-
tifying these thoroughgoing misrepresentations (Grinnell,
1997; Royse, 1999; Rubin & Babbie, 2001).
Interestingly, the ideas comprising the heuristic
paradigm have by now achieved such wide appeal in social
work that opposition to the heuristic paradigm has devel-
oped a surprising new form: (a) misrepresenting it as un-
necessary, undesirable, or relativistic, while at the same
time (b) incorporating entire portions of the heuristic
paradigm, and then (c) combining the ideas appropriated
from the heuristic paradigm with contradictory ideas
drawn from the flawed logical empiricist approach to re-
search. Examples of this new type of opposition occur in
the article by Bolland and Atherton (this issue) and in the
work of Anastas and MacDonald (1994), and Anastas
(1999). These authors first thoroughly and systematically
misrepresent and dismiss the heuristic paradigm. Then,
they recommend fallible realism as if it were in opposition
to the heuristic paradigm, when in fact fallible realism was
originally imported into social work by Heineman Pieper
(1981, 1987, 1989) as part of the heuristic paradigm, and
two papers elucidating this perspective were reprinted as
foundations for the heuristic paradigm in Tyson’s (1995)
textbook (one by Bhaskar [1989] who calls it “transcen-
dental” or “critical” realism [1975, 1991], and the paper
by Manicas & Secord [1983] to which Anastas & Mac-
Donald [1994], Anastas [1999], and Bolland & Atherton
refer). After claiming the heuristic paradigm opposes a
“straw man” and that the legacy of logical empiricism is
“dead” in social work (Bolland & Atherton, this issue),
these authors proceed to recommend logical empiricist
concepts in their proposed frameworks for social work re-
search (for example, Popper’s ideas for research design and
theory-testing, see below).
The occasion for this essay is a response to Bolland and
Atherton (this issue). However, because Bolland and
Atherton’s article completely misrepresents the heuristic
paradigm, logical empiricism, and the implications for so-
cial work of the choice between them, we have decided
not to bore readers with what would have to be an endless
catalogue of errors and corrections. Rather, we will help
readers to understand why the choice of research
paradigm is critically important for all social workers, why
the heuristic paradigm is the only choice that will enable
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social work to achieve its true scientific and humanistic po-
tential, and how to recognize logical empiricist and rela-
tivist research concepts, especially now that some logical
empiricists are cloaking their beliefs in ideas appropriated
from the heuristic paradigm. 
What is a Paradigm, and
Why Should We Care?
Some of our readers may wonder what a research
paradigm really is and why the choice of a research paradigm
is so important for social workers. In this section, we will
briefly clarify the nature of a research paradigm and why it
matters. Often those debating social work’s choice of re-
search paradigms conflate a research
method and a research paradigm
(metatheory) (e.g., Anastas & Mac-
Donald, 1994; Anastas, 1999; Grin-
nell, 1997; Mullen, 1995; Padgett,
1988; Royse, 1999; Rubin & Bab-
bie, 2001; Thyer, 1993). Research
methods are systematic ways of know-
ing, such as ethnographic methods,
experimental designs, and single and
multiple case studies. Methods are
chosen as part of the research design
process when a researcher makes sev-
eral decisions, including how to for-
mulate the problem, what kind(s) of
data to collect, how it will be collect-
ed, how it will be analyzed, and how
he or she will reason from the data to
the conclusions. 
In contrast to a research
method, a research paradigm is a
set of fundamental assumptions,
beliefs, and values that determines
the bases on which we decide what counts as genuine sci-
entific knowledge. As we shall see, social work has three
research paradigms available to it, and each one has rad-
ically different consequences for the actual and possible
contents of social work’s knowledge base and the values
the field can express.
The term “paradigm” was famously applied in the his-
tory and philosophy of science by Thomas Kuhn. Our def-
inition of a paradigm and our examples of paradigms
(heuristic paradigm, logical empiricism, relativism) more
than meet Kuhn’s definitions of the term. Whereas Kuhn
warrants using the term paradigm for matching a single
component of the “disciplinary matrix,” the heuristic
paradigm (like the other examples) matches all of Kuhn’s
stated components because it is, in fact, a full-fledged dis-
ciplinary matrix (or paradigm in the largest and fullest
sense). Although a match with one of Kuhn’s criteria
would sufficiently justify our use of the term, we will illus-
trate matches with all four of Kuhn’s criteria: (a) “symbol-
ic generalizations”; (b) “the metaphysical parts of
paradigms,” “models,” or commitments to beliefs; (c)
“values”; and (d) exemplars (1970, p. 182–184). 
Kuhn says symbolic generalizations are statements that
function as laws in the sense that they are principles 
and “definitions of some of the symbols” the research
community deploys (1970, p. 183). The generalizations
may be cast in a logical or numeric form, or in words. Sci-
entists subscribing to the paradigm
share a common commitment to
these generalizations. An example
of such generalizations in the
heuristic paradigm is, “All 
research methods are heuristic
choices (and therefore their value is
purpose- and context-relative),
rather than intrinsically privileged
ways of knowing” (Heineman
Pieper, 1981, 1989; Tyson, 1995).
Kuhn states that paradigms
consist of metaphysical parts, mod-
els, or commitments to beliefs
(1970, p. 182–184). Kuhn also
recognizes a range of depths at
which these models or commit-
ments operate, but all function to
“determine what will be accepted
as an explanation” (p. 184). Re-
search paradigms operate at the
deepest level of all, by determining
the very structure of acceptable ex-
planation. The heuristic paradigm, social work’s logical
empiricist paradigm, and relativism are all paradigms ac-
cording to Kuhn’s criterion. As will be shown below, they
make (opposing) commitments to what can be explained
or known and how it is possible to explain or know it. 
Kuhn also defines a paradigm as comprised of shared
values. He specifies that, “though they [values] function at
all times,” these values are especially critical “when the
members of a particular community must identify crisis or,
later, choose between incompatible ways of practicing
their discipline,” that these values are used in “judging
whole theories,” and that the values in paradigms deter-
mine decisions such as whether “science should (or need
17
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not) be socially useful” (Kuhn, 1970, pp. 184–185). As
will become even more obvious when we outline their
contrasting values, the heuristic paradigm, logical empiri-
cism, and relativism are incompatible paradigms in exactly
this sense. 
Kuhn’s final type of paradigm component is “exem-
plars,” or “shared examples” (p. 186–191). Kuhn remarks
that common, worked-out examples function “as a tool,
informing the student what similarities to look for, signal-
ing the gestalt in which the situation is to be seen,” and
teaching the student how to view “the situations that con-
front him as a scientist in the same gestalt as other mem-
bers of his specialists’ group” (p.
189). The importance of exem-
plars to both the heuristic
paradigm and the logical empiricist
paradigm is evident in the fact that,
in their research textbooks, propo-
nents of both paradigms devote
considerable space to worked-out
examples of how to apply the gen-
eral research principles to specific
research questions (Anastas, 1999;
Grinnell, 1997; Rubin & Babbie,
2001; Tyson, 1995). 
Kuhn identifies two characteris-
tics of paradigms that are especially
relevant here. First, alternative
paradigms are fundamentally con-
tradictory and incompatible (“in-
commensurable”), even as they may
incorporate the same lower level
data, concepts, or theories. We will
see how the heuristic paradigm, logical empiricism, and rel-
ativism are fundamentally incompatible frameworks for so-
cial work research, even though both the heuristic paradigm
and logical empiricism incorporate experimental methods.
Second, the diverse, defining components of paradigms (or
“constituents of the disciplinary matrix”) “form a whole
and function together” (p. 182). This is why it is incoher-
ent to “pick and choose” among the ideas of the heuristic
paradigm and why attempts at “compromises” or “solu-
tions” to the debates over social work’s research founda-
tions (e.g., Anastas, 1999; Anastas & MacDonald, 1994;
Bisman & Hardcastle, 1999; Bolland & Atherton, this
issue; Peile, 1988) are both unnecessary and detrimental:
they create fundamental inconsistencies in social work’s ap-
proach to science and prevent social work research from re-
placing unsound logical empiricist ideas with the solid, co-
herent framework offered by the heuristic paradigm.
A research paradigm (metatheory) is fundamentally
distinct not just from a research method but also from a
theory. Bolland and Atherton conflate metatheories and
theories when they assert that the heuristic paradigm, in
welcoming diverse theories and ways of evaluating them
(diverse ontologies and epistemologies), “has no distinc-
tive disciplinary matrix composed of ordered elements”
(p. 11) at the metatheory level. We have already shown
this assertion to be false.  Theories are a species of scien-
tific knowledge, whereas metatheories set the conditions
for scientific knowledge. Metatheories influence the form,
construction, and evaluation of theories. 
In order to fully understand re-
search paradigms, it is important to
understand the distinction between
the process of science and the philos-
ophy of science. Bolland and Ather-
ton claim that a focus on the phi-
losophy of science (a scientist’s
paradigm) is irrelevant to the pro-
cess of science (pp. 11 & 12). They
dismiss objections to Popper as
“philosophical” and then misrepre-
sent Popper’s views as simply “the
idea that knowledge changes be-
cause it is subject to challenge and
review by other scientists” (p. 12).
In fact, (with the sole exception of
relativism, see below) all approach-
es to research—including the
heuristic paradigm—recognize that
challenge and review by other sci-
entists is at the heart of generating
scientific knowledge.  As we will see, Bolland and Ather-
ton, by invoking Popper, impose very specific and harmful
beliefs about and prescriptions for social work research.
Furthermore, it very much matters not just what scientists
do (the process of science), but also what they think and
intend to do (their philosophy of science). We will show
how a scientist’s fundamental assumptions and beliefs
(philosophy of science) significantly affect the quality of
her or his science.
Historians and philosophers of science demonstrated
50 years ago that one of the flaws of logical empiricism is
that its beliefs about scientific knowledge do not match
the process of what scientists actually do (Hanson, 1958;
Hull, 1988; Kuhn, 1970). In the field of social work, the
wide chasm between what logical empiricist researchers
were actually doing (their process, which like all research
has inevitably relied on heuristics) and what these re-
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searchers claimed they were doing (their philosophy,
which held that some ways of knowing were intrinsically
less biased), caused bias to proliferate unregulated, values
to operate invisibly (and often undesirably), and scientific
quality to be fundamentally compromised (Heineman
Pieper, 1981, 1989; Tyson, 1995). 
We can now see why social work’s choice of a research
paradigm is of paramount importance for the future of
our field and our society. Because it determines the bases
on which we evaluate knowledge claims, the paradigm
shapes the actual and possible contents of social work
knowledge, including the possible value positions that
can be expressed within that knowledge base. The
paradigm regulates the discoveries social workers can
make and endorse about issues important to the welfare
of society. By determining what we can know, the
paradigm centrally impacts the sorts of practices and poli-
cies we design, and what kinds of values we build into our
personal, professional, and societal relationships. In the
next section, we present the three paradigms available to
social workers today and show the implications of each
for social work knowledge and values.
Paradigms in Social 
Work Research Today
Logical Empiricism
First introduced into social work in the 1950s (Social
Work Research Group, 1955), the logical empiricist
paradigm of social work research quickly took over the field
(Tyson, 1995). Starting in 1981, Heineman Pieper ex-
posed the hegemonic operation of this paradigm in social
work, detailed its roots in the failed logical empiricist phi-
losophy of science, and demonstrated its significant adverse
effects on social work research and knowledge. Although
the logical empiricist paradigm has since lost ground, it
continues to have a significant and detrimental impact on
our field (documented in Heineman Pieper, 1994; Salee-
bey, 1989; Tyson, 1992; Weick, 1991; Witkin, 1993,
1998), and social workers are better prepared to recognize
and excise it when they understand its core tenets.
Although positivist ideas have existed since antiquity,
social workers imported the very restrictive brand of posi-
tivism that was developed in Vienna between the two
World Wars and was called logical positivism (subsequent-
ly, logical empiricism). Logical positivism was the product
of a group of philosophers of science, most notably Car-
nap, Neurath, Schlick, and Waissman.  As described by a
founding logical positivist, Carnap, these philosophers 
… assumed that there was a certain rock bottom of
knowledge, the knowledge of the immediately given,
which was indubitable. Every other kind of knowl-
edge was supposed to be firmly supported by this basis
and therefore likewise decidable with certainty.
(Carnap, 1991, p. 57) 
To achieve their aim of certain scientific knowledge,
the logical positivists advanced two primary commitments:
(a) to use methodological and other structural criteria to
differentiate scientifically meaningful propositions from
those they deemed scientifically “meaningless,” and (b) to
excise values, subjectivity, and ontological premises (fun-
damental assumptions about reality) from scientific theo-
ries and the process of theory testing (identified in Han-
fling, 1981; Scriven, 1969). 
Initially, the logical positivists required that, in order to
be scientifically meaningful, propositions had to be “veri-
fiable” or “testable” (Carnap, 1936). However, their po-
sition was almost immediately debunked as untenable by
other philosophers of science, and so they retreated to a
less stringent criterion that, in order to be scientific,
propositions should be testable in principle, that is that
one could envision a way of testing one’s proposition even
if one could not carry it out (Hempel, 1965). They called
this variant “logical empiricism.”  Within a few decades,
logical positivism and logical empiricism had both been
discarded as irredeemably unsound by the hard sciences
and by leading philosophers of science (Einstein, 1959;
Hanson, 1958; Kuhn, 1970; Margenau, 1966; Quine,
1948; Scriven, 1969; Suppe, 1977). 
Despite the sound debunking in philosophy and the
hard sciences, some of the ideas espoused by the Vienna
Circle rose from the dead to be reborn in the social and
behavioral sciences and in social work during the 1950s.
In this reincarnation, logical empiricist ideas had three pri-
mary features (identified in Brown, 1977; Heineman
Pieper, 1981, 1989; Scriven, 1969; Tyson, 1995): (a) the-
ory-testing could and should eliminate induction (reason-
ing from the specific to the general) and rely solely on de-
duction (reasoning from the general to the specific) (e.g.,
Wallace, 1971), (b) certain methodological and other
structural criteria (such as whether or not the method used
“operationalized” data and/or experimental design) of-
fered a privileged way to evaluate knowledge claims, and
(c) values (including, for instance, advocacy for social jus-
tice) could and should be eliminated from science. For sci-
entific contexts, the imported ideas functionally erased the
distinction the Vienna Circle philosophers made between
logical positivism and logical empiricism. Accordingly, for
19
the purposes of social work research, the terms logical em-
piricism and logical positivism are interchangeable. 
Each of the three assumptions will be discussed in
turn. First, whereas logical empiricists in social work at-
tempt to structure the research process so that there is a
hierarchy of methods in which some (often deemed ex-
ploratory or qualitative, e.g. Grinnell, 1997; Rubin &
Babbie, 2001; Williams, Unrau, & Grinnell, 1998) are ac-
knowledged to rely heavily on induction, but others are
thought to avoid induction, contemporary philosophers
and scientists in the hard sciences recognize that scientific
knowledge invariably entails countless instances of induc-
tion, and that any empirical
investigation relies upon
induction in myriad ways
at every step of the re-
search process (e.g., induc-
tion is required whenever
we define a concept,
choose a theory to test, or
decide whether or not a






can only blind themselves
to the inductive processes
they are using. For exam-
ple, logical empiricist social
work researchers promote such blindness when they false-
ly assert that “empirical methods” can operate indepen-
dently of theories and can provide neutral, “theory-free”
evidence for or against them (Grinnell, 1997; Reid,
1994a, 1994b; Rubin & Babbie, 2001; Myers & Thyer,
1997; Thyer, 1991, 2001).
Second, “structural” considerations such as types of
data and methodologies are an extremely unreliable basis
for deciding the quality of research products. All ways of
gathering data, and all methodologies, entail systematic
biases. For instance, as Danziger (1985) pointed out, de-
signs that use large samples maximize anonymity and sim-
ilarity according to predetermined criteria, and minimize
the subjects’ differences, by comparison with designs that
preserve the unique, diverse meanings of a small sample
of subjects. Researchers using the heuristic paradigm rec-
ognize that the value of particular methods can only be
ascertained in relation to, among other considerations,
the question the scientist wants to answer and the theory
the scientist is using to address it. Although some logical
empiricist social workers claim to recognize this fact, in
reality they belie their claims by continuing to uphold hi-
erarchies of types of data and methods (Grinnell, 1997;
Rubin & Babbie, 2001; Thyer & Myers, 1998; Williams,
Unrau, & Grinnell, 1998). One destructive consequence
of logical empiricist methodological prescriptions is that
social work research lost its relevance to practitioner con-
cerns and real world problems (McNicoll, 1999; Salee-
bey, 1979; Salomon, 1967; Vigilante, 1974; Wainstock,
1994) because social work researchers unrecognizably
transformed their research questions on the procrustean
bed of logical empiricists’
preferred methodologies
(such as a stringent, quan-
titatively-based opera-
tionism). Even more de-
structive, because such
methodological prescrip-
tions are unwarranted, they
are misleading standards
for developing and evaluat-
ing scientific knowledge
and fundamentally com-
promise the quality and
value of social work’s scien-
tific knowledge base.
Third, it is impossible
to eliminate values and sub-
jectivity from science (Avis,
1994; Bhaskar, 1989; Lath-
er, 1986a, 1986b; Sperry, 1983), and, as Scriven (1969)
pointed out, even the effort to do so reflects a value
choice. For social workers, it is both an impossible and a
completely undesirable aim. As a result of logical empiri-
cist prohibitions against adopting an explicit value posi-
tion, social work research and knowledge was forced to ex-
press and reinforce an unreflective, unchosen status quo
(Heineman Pieper, 1981, 1989, 1994; Tyson, 1995). 
Not only does logical empiricism’s general stance
against explicit value positions (such as advocacy) force so-
cial work research to abet an unreflective, unchosen status
quo, but also the specification of broadly preferred data
types and methods that researchers preferentially apply ir-
respective of their local research contexts itself embodies
specific values. Yet, because alternative approaches are dis-
allowed by logical empiricists, social workers educated in
the logical empiricist tradition are unaware both of what
they are endorsing and of what they could be endorsing
(what they are missing). 
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Some authors (Bolland & Atherton, this issue) try to
argue that logical empiricism is “dead” in social work.
Ironically, these same authors (like many others, such as
Grinnell, 1997; Reid, 1994a, 1994b; Rubin & Babbie,
2001; Thyer, 1991) recommend logical empiricist ideas to
social workers in the here-and-now. For example, Bolland
and Atherton (this issue) attempt to elevate Sir Karl Pop-
per’s deductive method of theory testing and falsification as
a viable alternative to logical empiricist ideas and as a shin-
ing example for the future of social work research. Al-
though Popper, who met with the Vienna Circle logical
positivists, was aware of many of the logical positivists’ er-
rors and did not call himself a logical positivist, he sought
to fulfill their unattainable and misguided aim of eliminat-
ing induction from theory-testing so as to arrive at certain
scientific knowledge. In fact, as many scholars have demon-
strated, Popper’s reformulations rest on the same basic log-
ical empiricist foundations already outlined and come apart
on the same shoals (Mitroff, 1973; Nickles, 1987; Suppe,
1977, esp. citing Putnam, p. 424ff; Tyson, 1995).
Popper’s hypothetico-deductive method sets out strict
criteria for how scientists should proceed in testing theo-
ries: creating a (harmful and artificial) categorical divide
between theory testing and the process of discovery, de-
ducing a prediction from a theory, eliminating retrospec-
tive designs, and privileging certain kinds of data (e.g.
“raw” sense data) that are falsely believed to be more
“basic” and “objective” (and thus acceptable for the “crit-
ical” tests). When Bolland and Atherton state that Pop-
per’s hypothetico-deductive method “openly starts from a
theory” (p. 4), they falsely imply that Popper recognized
that no ways of knowing are ever theory- or value-free. In
fact, Popper’s hypothetico-deductive method mentions
theories only to replicate the logical empiricist divide be-
tween “theories,” interpreted as logical structures, and
“facts” or observations, which are presumed to be so the-
ory- and value-neutral that scientists can tell if a theory is
false if a finding from a single (“critical”) experiment dis-
confirms it (Popper, 1959). Contemporary philosophers
of science recognize that there are no neutral, “critical”
tests, because there are no unmediated reports from na-
ture (no experiment or finding can ever speak for itself).
Instead, credibility results from a series of choices made by
the researcher and the evaluations by her or his scientific
community (Callebaut, 1993; Galison, 1987; Wimsatt,
1981, 1987).
Like Popper’s hypothetico-deductive method, Pop-
per’s doctrine of falsification fails to effect his hoped-for
separation from the logical empiricists. Popper turned to
“falsification”—the requirement that research questions
be formulated so that they could be “disconfirmed” by
one finding—to try to avoid the problem of induction that
had dashed the logical empiricists’ hopes of constructing a
superior, privileged methodology (Popper, 1959). Yet, as
Wesley Salmon (1971) showed, induction is equally indis-
pensable to the falsification as to the confirmation of the-
ories, because no matter how many hypotheses we falsify,
there will always be other possible alternatives that are
consistent with our data, and any attempt to choose
among these requires induction (Heineman [Pieper],
1981; Salmon, 1971; Tyson, 1995). Moreover, induction
is indispensable even to the decision that a single theory is
ever definitively “falsified,” because induction undergirds
the belief that the theory will continue to appear false at
other times, places, and contexts.
Thus, rather than being an alternative to the logical
empiricist perspective, Popper’s hypothetico-deductive
method and falsification are simply another expression of
it. By advocating that social workers adhere to Popper’s
formulations, Bolland and Atherton’s work proves that
the heuristic paradigm is debunking not a straw man but
current and pervasive—though false—beliefs. 
The adoption of logical empiricism, including Pop-
per’s methods, in social work has constituted a giant leap
backwards, both for the scientific rigor of social work’s
knowledge base and for the field’s ability to accomplish its
stated mission. Because logical empiricism’s misleading
and unwarranted restrictions prevent social work from ac-
curately evaluating what does and does not constitute
knowledge, the logical empiricist research paradigm un-
dermines the capacity of social work’s knowledge base ever
to achieve its true scientific potential. Among other prob-
lems, logical empiricist social work researchers: (a) reject-
ed as “unscientific” the original, path-breaking research
contributions of its founders (such as Jane Addams, So-
phonisba Breckinridge, Edith Abbott, and Mary Rich-
mond) (see, for instance, Austin, 1978; Briar, 1979; Reid,
1994a; Schuerman, 1987); (b) set up structural impedi-
ments to social work’s accomplishment of its mission of
advocacy (as in Gibbs, 1983; Rubin & Babbie, 2001); (c)
devalued research methods that practitioners in the
trenches could most readily use to generate knowledge
relevant to improving services, creating a gulf between
practitioners and researchers (as in Grinnell, 1997; Task
Force on Social Work Research, 1991; Thyer, 1989); and
(d) set up criteria that stifled the originality and scientific
development of social workers that began from the mo-
ment of their education in logical empiricist social work
research and extended through publication standards and
criteria for promotion and tenure of faculty (documented
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in Cloward, 1998; Hartman, 1990; Heineman Pieper,
1989; McNicoll, 1999; Tyson, 1995; Weick, 1992)
Relativism 
It is ironic that the heuristic paradigm is often con-
fused with relativism (Anastas, 1999; Anastas & MacDon-
ald, 1994; Bloom, 1990; Bolland & Atherton, this issue),
because relativism is more akin to logical empiricism than
it is to the heuristic paradigm: Relativism shares logical
empiricism’s fundamental aversion to reliance on the sci-
entist’s informed judgment, and also denies that a re-
searcher adopting a (relativist/logical empiricist) paradigm
inevitably is making theory and value commitments. In
scientific contexts, relativism holds that there is no rational
basis for deciding how accurate
or inaccurate a theory or evidence
is vis-à-vis the reality it seeks to
describe (defined in Newton-
Smith, 1984, p. 369–370; Tyson,
1995, p. 514). Because rationali-
ty is deemed impotent to evaluate
the quality of knowledge claims,
relativists believe that what is
“real” (or true) is ultimately de-
termined by arbitrary or idiosyn-
cratic personal preference or so-
cial influences like power. 
Although few social workers
say they are relativist, some un-
knowingly advance relativist ideas
when they say that all values are so
culturally dependent that we can-
not legitimately advance humanistic values as an ideal for
our field. Another manifestation of relativism is the belief
that it is pointless or even harmful to develop formulated
theories because theories are assumed to be nothing more
than depositories of social contextual influences. This type
of relativist believes that science is such a deeply irrational
process that we are better off being skeptics about all the-
ories. But as many have long recognized, this is in fact just
another form of theory (Heineman Pieper, 1981; Scriven,
1969). Moreover, when it comes to the moment of actual-
ly formulating something to do with a client (or clients),
social workers, like all scientists, inevitably choose a theory
(Heineman Pieper, 1989; Tyson, 1995).
Relativism has a destructive impact for social work that
has not been sufficiently recognized. The assumption that
knowledge claims cannot be decided rationally leads rela-
tivists to deny the possibility of reflective and meaningful
discussion and to devalue the exercise of rational, in-
formed judgment. Since informed judgment is the only
sound basis for evaluating scientific knowledge, relativism,
like logical empiricism, undermines the scientific quality
and value of social work knowledge.
The Heuristic Paradigm
The heuristic paradigm is the only paradigm for social
work research that is grounded in coherent conceptual
and scientific foundations, and that is consistent with 
social work’s humanistic values and ideals. Moreover, 
the heuristic paradigm provides social workers with an 
entire toolbox for understanding, designing, and evaluat-
ing scientific social work research. Here, we will provide 
a brief summary of a few of 
the main characteristics of the
heuristic paradigm. For more in-
depth descriptions, we refer our
readers to our previous works
(Heineman Pieper 1981, 1982a,
1982b, 1986a, 1986b, 1987,
1988, 1989, 1994; Heineman
Pieper & Tyson, 1999; Tyson,
1992, 1994a, 1994b, 1994c,
1995) and to the sources, fully ref-
erenced in our writings, from
which we have drawn. 
As we indicated earlier, the
heuristic paradigm starts from the
realization that there are no privi-
leged realities and no inherently
superior modes of knowing. As a
result, there is no way to include all relevant information
in data gathering or analysis (no way to avoid induction).
All research methodologies therefore lose and distort
some information in the process of gathering and analyz-
ing data (all research methodologies are examples of
“heuristics,” see below). In fact, each methodology and
each family of methodologies tends to lose and distort in-
formation in systematic ways (Danziger, 1985; Wimsatt,
1981, 1986).  
Heuristics are ways of perceiving, knowing, or solving
problems. Because all heuristics (including the methodolo-
gies favored by the logical empiricists) inevitably lose and
distort information, and because different heuristics lose
different kinds of information and introduce different types
of distortions (Wimsatt, 1986), all heuristics are in-
escapably purpose- and context-relative (even when the re-
searchers who implement them are not aware of this fact
22
FAMILIES IN SOCIETY • Volume 83, Number 1
Since informed judgment is 
the only sound basis for 
evaluating scientific knowledge,
relativism, like logical 
empiricism, undermines the
scientific quality and value 
of social work knowledge.
Heineman-Pieper, Tyson, & Heineman Pieper • Doing Good Science Without Sacrificing Good Values
and make false claims for the status of their methods and
results). For example, in preserving more of some kinds of
information, heuristics entirely jettison other kinds of in-
formation. When the reality of interest to a researcher does
not generate information of the kind the heuristic pre-
serves, that reality cannot be known using that heuristic.
These tenets have several vital implications. First, be-
cause all research includes systematic biases (relies on
heuristics), these biases can only be managed when re-
searchers actively identify and govern them (using the tools
for bias recognition and management provided by the
heuristic paradigm and its sources), not when researchers
overlook or deny them (as logical empiricists do).
Second, the heuristic paradigm recognizes that bias is
reduced and truth promoted not by logical empiricists’ re-
strictiveness but rather by diversity and inclusiveness that
welcome a full range of questions,
methods, approaches, and value
positions.  Building on this realiza-
tion, the heuristic paradigm en-
ables social workers to ask whatev-
er questions they find most
interesting and to address them
using whatever theories, ap-
proaches, systems, data, and con-
texts they find most relevant and
useful. As a result, the heuristic
paradigm provides complete avail-
ability to diversity in what can be
studied and how it can be stud-
ied—without succumbing to rela-
tivism. In contrast, because logical
empiricists restricted social work
researchers to particular types of
data and required that data be operationalized or re-
ducible to basic sensory impressions, they profoundly cir-
cumscribed the kinds of realities that can be known in so-
cial work. Many issues of great import for social workers
are included among the aspects of reality that cannot be
effectively studied under logical empiricist restrictiveness,
such as motives, injustice, empowerment, society, values,
and meanings. Far from reflecting a lack of a fundamental
commitment to what Kuhn called a disciplinary matrix (as
Bolland & Atherton assert), the heuristic paradigm’s wel-
coming of diverse ontologies and ways of knowing is in it-
self a commitment that is completely in accord with and
makes it possible for social work to accomplish its tradi-
tional mission. 
Third, unlike logical empiricism, which constructs hi-
erarchies of more and less preferred methods, the heuris-
tic paradigm recognizes that decisions about research de-
sign should not be made at the paradigm level, as logical
empiricism tries to do, but should be decided by the in-
dividual researcher held to the exacting standards of ex-
plaining and justifying his/her choice to the research
community. The heuristic paradigm is the only paradigm
for social work research that offers a conceptually sound
and effective basis for evaluating the quality, meaning,
and value of scientific research and knowledge. The
heuristic paradigm follows the lead of the hard sciences
in recognizing that informed judgment is the best and
only ultimate standard we have for evaluating scientific
research and knowledge, and it offers logically sound
conceptual tools (as opposed to the unsound method-
ological prescriptions of logical empiricism) for honing
informed judgment so that it can be a fully adequate
basis. Logical empiricism and rel-
ativism are both at odds with es-
tablished wisdom in the hard sci-
ences and up-to-date philosophy
of science, because both of these
paradigms devalue informed
judgment by denying its centrali-
ty to the meaningful evaluation
of knowledge claims: Logical
empiricism denigrates informed
judgment as untrustworthy, and
relativism denigrates it as impo-
tent. When logical empiricists
privilege methodological and
other structural markers for eval-
uating research, they actually un-
dermine the effective exercise of
informed judgment.
Fourth, the heuristic paradigm recognizes that one of
the scientist’s most challenging tasks is to truly understand
her or his assumptions, values, options, and choices, in-
cluding their implications, at every step of the research
process, and to apply this understanding to effective re-
search design and evaluation. Accordingly, among the
most important contributions of the heuristic paradigm
are the tools it offers, imported from postpositivist
philosophers of science, for identifying the heuristics en-
tailed in all research design decisions, ranging from choic-
es of research questions (including diverse types of systems
and causes), to choices of theories, values, and methods of
data collection and data analysis. These tools help re-
searchers become thoroughly reflective and truly expert at
designing their research and at recognizing and evaluating
their own and others’ research choices. For instance,
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Tyson (1995) elaborated many standards for theory evalu-
ation using the heuristic paradigm, including the scope of
the theory; the theory’s ability to explain phenomena we
need to explain, including
anomalies not explained by
other theories; the logical con-
sistency among assumptions,
concepts and principles; and
the entailed values, including
the theory’s relevance to the
field and its impact on social
inequalities and advocacy. To
give a different kind of exam-
ple, William Wimsatt (1981,
1986, 1987), a philosopher of
science whose work is central
to the heuristic paradigm,
teaches researchers how to re-
duce bias and increase robust-
ness by examining the same
reality using heuristics that
carry relevantly different bias-
es. The heuristic paradigm lets
social workers leverage what
they might experience as an unfortunate (though in-
escapable) reality (i.e., the true impossibility of certain or
privileged knowledge) into a powerful asset (i.e., robust,
significant knowledge built on heuristics that have been
wisely and effectively applied to the research context).
The choice of research paradigm for social work has sig-
nificant implications for the values possibly and actually ex-
pressed by the field. We have already seen how the logical
empiricist research paradigm forces social work research
and knowledge to advance the status quo and prevents so-
cial work from developing research and knowledge drawn
from alternative value positions. Unlike logical empiricism,
which imposes a single, unreflective value position on the
field, the heuristic paradigm recognizes that both truth and
goodness rely on the availability to diversity combined with
the freedom to make informed, considered choices, plus
the commitment to share the details of the research process
with the rest of the field to allow others to make their own
informed judgments about the meaning and value of the
research results. Under the heuristic paradigm, researchers
reflectively and explicitly identify and choose the values
they express in their research.
Many opponents of the heuristic paradigm seek to dis-
miss it by thoroughly and systematically misrepresenting
it. One of the most persistent of these misrepresentations
conflates the heuristic paradigm with naturalistic methods
and falsely asserts that the heuristic paradigm opposes ex-
perimental or interventionist methods (Anastas, 1999;
Anastas & MacDonald, 1994; Anastas & Congress, 1999;
Mullen, 1995; Padgett, 1998).
In fact, the heuristic paradigm
embraces the full complement
of types of rigorous data and
methods as potentially useful
tools, and recognizes that re-
search design decisions should
not be prioritized by a research
paradigm, but rather should be
made by the individual re-
searcher with a particular re-
search question and context in
mind. As Heineman Pieper
(1989) explained, “the rules of
the experimental method are
examples of heuristics. Under-
stood as heuristics, they are
potentially useful research
tools” (Heineman Pieper,
1989, p. 11). Thus, the heuris-
tic paradigm is thoroughly in-
clusive with regard to types of rigorous methods and data,
even as it unconditionally rejects the false claims logical
empiricists make for those methods, and even as it insists
on an accurate and reflective understanding (metatheory)
of the research process.
Three Paradigms for Social Work 
Research: The Choice for Social Workers
Social work can opt for one of three paradigms of re-
search. These paradigms are all fundamentally opposed to
and incompatible with each other, because each decides
research quality and knowledge claims on fundamentally
different and opposed bases, and each expresses and en-
courages completely different values. In terms of the bases
for evaluating knowledge claims, relativism claims that
there is no rational basis on which to evaluate knowledge
claims, and that therefore such evaluation is merely a mat-
ter of arbitrary personal and social preference driven by
power and interest. The logical empiricist research
paradigm erroneously assumes that particular types of
methods and data are intrinsically more immune to bias
and intrinsically more trustworthy than other defensible
types of methods and data, and prescribes the preferred
methods and data for all contexts. Other methods and
data are only used when the preferred types simply aren’t
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feasible, and then the knowledge they yield is devalued
(for example, as merely “exploratory,” requiring use of the
preferred methods to provide “confirmation”).
The heuristic paradigm
claims that both logical em-




criteria are incapable of pro-
viding an accurate guide to
the quality of research prod-
ucts and other knowledge
claims, the evaluation of
knowledge claims can, in fact,
be made rationally, intelligent-
ly, and scientifically—by rely-
ing on informed human judg-
ment. The heuristic paradigm
further helps social workers to
hone their informed judg-
ment by presenting the best
and most up-to-date concep-
tual tools available in contem-
porary philosophy of science
and in the hard sciences. Al-
though some logical empiri-
cist authors assert that they
value researchers’ informed judgment and appreciate its
importance in, for example, selecting methods to fit the
research problem, in fact they belie their assertions by si-
multaneously endeavoring to shackle that judgment to
fundamentally logical empiricist assumptions about the
research process, including the hierarchies of broadly pre-
ferred methods.  By contrast, the heuristic paradigm gen-
uinely recognizes and appreciates the significance of in-
formed judgment to the design and evaluation of
scientific research and provides social workers with the
tools they need to use their judgment fully and effective-
ly. Armed with the heuristic paradigm’s conceptual tools,
readers can make accurate and informed decisions about
the quality and trustworthiness of their own and others’
research products. 
The three paradigms of social work research also ex-
press opposing values. Relativism ultimately expresses
solipsism (Descartes, 1993/1637)—the viewpoint that le-
gitimate, shared knowledge is impossible. In denying a ra-
tional basis for evaluating differing knowledge claims, rela-
tivism subjugates truth and goodness to arbitrary personal
preference and social influences like power, thereby also ex-
pressing the value of might makes right (or true). Because
relativism explicitly states that all values are equal and there
is no basis for preferring any one theory, it completely un-
dermines social workers’ ratio-
nal basis for making judgments
about inequality, and hence
our efforts to bring about a
more just society. In practice,
however, social workers are
not relativists—they recognize
that some cultural values, such
as racism, perpetuate social in-
justices. Our science needs to
be nonrelativist in order to be
able to identify those injustices
and remedy their effects.
By preventing the explicit
choice of values in scientific
research, and forcing a divorce
of science and advocacy, logi-
cal empiricism imposes a total-
itarian set of values that sup-
ports the status quo. In
addition, by limiting scientific
inquiry to a restricted set of
privileged methods, logical
empiricism prevents science
from transcending the particu-
lar biases of those methods, which when applied to the
context of human relationships and development, ob-
structs the study of realities that are in fact vital for social
workers to understand. In contrast, only under the heuris-
tic paradigm can researchers make a reflective choice—
take value positions explicitly, have free choice about re-
search designs, and be capable of thoughtful discussion
and evaluation of research, theories and values.
Conclusion 
We have shown how social workers today face the cru-
cial choice of which foundations they will choose for the
field: relativism, logical empiricism, or the heuristic
paradigm. We have shown how logical empiricism and rela-
tivism undercut—and how the heuristic paradigm en-
hances—social workers’ efforts to generate relevant, signifi-
cant, and accurate social work knowledge and to fulfill their
humanistic and professional ideals. Because proponents of
logical empiricist beliefs have obscured the choice for social
workers by misrepresenting all aspects of the debates over
social work’s research foundations, this article clarifies the
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tenets of—and the implications for social work of adopt-
ing—each of the three paradigms of social work research.
By welcoming the full complement of rigorous re-
search methods and types of data, by encouraging social
workers to address whatever questions they find most
important in whatever ways they find most useful, and by
giving social workers the needed tools to accurately un-
derstand their own and others’ research choices, the
heuristic paradigm heals the unnecessary divisions in so-
cial work, such as between researchers and practitioners,
between proponents of different research methods, and
between proponents of different theories. Some logical
empiricists repeatedly misrepresent the heuristic
paradigm as opposing experimental methods, but we
have shown that in fact it is only logical empiricism that
favors and disfavors research methods at the paradigm
level, and that the heuristic paradigm warmly welcomes
all rigorous research methods and types of data—and
fully empowers researchers to decide the best way to ad-
dress their own research questions and contexts. The
heuristic paradigm guarantees research quality not by
misguidedly instituting structural rules and require-
ments, but instead by relying on informed judgment (the
same standard as in the hard sciences)—and then helping
social workers to cultivate and hone their informed judg-
ment about research design and evaluation. Because it
insists on an accurate and reflective understanding of the
research process, the heuristic paradigm opposes only the
misleading and harmful claims about research that are
the defining characteristics of logical empiricism and rel-
ativism—not any of the research methods or particular
theories that might have been researched under those
paradigms. All of these research methods and theories
can (far more effectively) be applied from within the
heuristic paradigm. 
In sum, we have shown how only the heuristic
paradigm provides social workers with a thoroughly co-
herent, accurate, and unifying understanding of the re-
search process and also the tools to use that under-
standing to generate robust, meaningful, and effective
social work knowledge capable of sensitively informing
social work practice and sustaining all of social work’s
treasured ideals. Dispelling the repeated and thorough-
going misrepresentations advanced by proponents of
logical empiricist and relativist social work research
paradigms, this paper helps social workers to make a
truly informed and reflective choice. By fully embracing
and choosing the heuristic paradigm, social work can re-
alize its true potential as a first-rate science committed
to humanistic ideals.
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